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How Centralization Affects Voter Turnout: The Case of California
Seiji  FUJII＊
　　　The Downsian model of voting predicts that only a few people will vote 
since the expected return to voting is far smaller than the cost. But in reality, 
millions vote. This paradox of voting remains unsolved for more than half a 
century. I examine empirically the prediction in the context of fi scal centralization 
which occurred in California in the late 1970s. The state of California limited 
the property tax rate to 1 percent of the purchase price when Proposition 13 
was approved by the electorate in 1978. As a result, property tax revenues, on 
which local governments rely, declined to less than half, and the authorities lost 
discretionary power to set tax policy. I test the hypotheses that voter turnout 
for elected government officials at local level was lower after the passage of 
proposition 13 than before since the electoral outcomes matter less. I address 
voting for county boards of supervisors and school board members. Findings 
suggest that voter turnout for county boards of supervisors declined but that for 
school board members did not.
Key words:  Fiscal centralization, Property tax, Voter turnout, County board of 
supervisors, School board members
1. Introduction
　　　Downs（1957）predicted that only a few people will vote since the expected 
return to voting is far smaller than the cost when casting their ballots is hardly 
decisive to electoral outcomes. Motivated by this argument, an extensive literature has 
developed the rational voter model to answer why voter turnout is higher than Downs 
predicted（Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1975; Tideman, 1985; 
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Glazer and Grofman, 1992; Aldrich, 1993). Controversies still surround the rational 
voter model both theoretically and empirically（Mueller 2003, Ch. 14; Duffy and 
Tavits, 2008).
　　　The Downsian voter model has the following form:
,  ⑴
where R is a person's expected return to voting, P is the probability that one's ballot 
will change the electoral outcome, B is a voter's benefi t from having one's preferred 
candidate win or the difference in expected utilities from policies of the two candidates, 
D is positive satisfaction from fulfi lling a sense of civic duty and seeing democracy 
continue as well as positive satisfaction for expressing solidarity with a candidate, and 
C is the cost of voting, e.g., time spent on going to the polls and gathering information. 
A person votes if R is positive.
　　　To address the Downs paradox, I look at a situation in which fi nancial power 
shifted from local governments to state government and ask how voter turnout for local 
government officials differed at the following elections. The constituent of the state 
of California approved the voter initiative, Proposition 13, which limited property tax 
rate to 1 percent of purchase price, resulting in local governments losing property tax 
revenues and power to set tax policy. Thus, Proposition 13 reduces the B term in value 
in equation (1) since the difference in the expected utilities from policies of the two 
candidates becomes smaller. Then, I hypothesize that more people will abstain at the 
local elections when, ceteris paribus, the electoral outcome matters less, as predicted 
by the Downs model.
　　　The organization of this paper is as follows: The next section explains 
Proposition 13. The third section goes over the hypothesis testing and shows the 
results. The last section will conclude.
　　　
2. Proposition 13
　　　Proposition 13 was a voter initiative constitutional amendment, which approved 
by voters by a 2-1 margin at the 1978 primary election in California. Proposition 13 
limited the property tax rate to 1 percent of purchase price uniformly across counties. 
Prior to the passage of Proposition 13, each local authority（counties, cities, school 
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districts, and special districts）had the power to determine how much property tax 
revenue to collect each year. Property tax rates generally varied between 1.5 percent 
and 3.5 percent of market value, and the average rate was about 2.5 percent（O'Sullivan 
et al., 1995).
　　　Proposition 13 specifi es the followings. (1) The real property tax rate is limited 
to 1 percent of the full cash value. (2) The full cash value of the property is its value 
as of 1976-1977. (3) When there is a change of ownership, the property is assessed 
at its market value. (4) The full cash value can increase with infl ation up to 2 percent 
annually. And (5) state and local governments cannot impose any additional ad valorem 
taxes on real property. The state government also cannot impose any additional taxes 
without a two-thirds majority vote of the legislature. The city, county, and special 
district cannot impose additional taxes without a two-thirds majority vote of their 
electorate. Total tax revenues collected by the county government are redistributed 
to local governments such as cities, school districts and special districts within each 
county according to the state law.
　　　When Proposition 13 took effect, county governments suffered a 52.3 percent 
decrease in general property tax revenues from fi scal year 1977-78 to 1978-79. 33.2 
percent of general county revenues were real property collections in 1977-78, whose 
share fell to 16.9 percent in 1978-79. School and community college districts suffered 
a 53.1 percent decrease in property tax revenues from fi scal year 1977-78 to 1978-79. 
The percentage of property tax revenues in the general funds of school and community 
college districts was 51.5 percent in 1977-78, which declined to 24.5 percent in 
1978-79. See Graph 1 below. As a result, local governments had to turn to the state 
legislature for fi nancial assistance and raise existing fees or enact new local levies such 
as property transfer fees or utility user fees to offset losses in property tax revenues. 
In this sense, Proposition 13 centralized the financial structure of public sector in 
California.
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Graph 1.  Effects of Proposition 13 on Revenues of Counties and School districts 
Sources:
California, State Controller, Annual Report of Financial Transactions concerning 
Counties of California, various years.
California, State Controller, Annual Report of Financial Transactions concerning 
School Districts of California, various years.
　　　State aid was available to compensate for property tax revenue losses, although 
the magnitude of losses and the extent to which state subsidies have replaced the 
losses have varied among different levels of government. Due to state bailout bills, 
both short-run and long-run assistances, net losses were 6.1 percent for general county 
revenues and 1.2 percent for the general funds of school and community college 
districts respectively in fi scal year 1978-79. The incomes in general funds for school 
and community college districts went up by 10 percent from fiscal year 1977-78 to 
1979-80. On the other hand, the general county revenues decreased by 2.8 percent from 
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fi scal year 1977-78 to 1979-80. 
　　　Proposition 13 was a salient and high profile issue in California in the late 
1970s. There are at least two reasons. One is the rapid increase in property tax bills 
and the other is a furious campaign done by the opponents to Proposition 13. Due to 
infl ation, some property tax bills doubled and tripled, and also income taxes increased 
by more than 1.5 times between 1974 and 1977（Rabushka and Ryan, 1982). The 
public required substantial tax relief and the legislature was well aware of this public 
pressure.
　　　Virtually every interest group opposed Proposition 13. Opponents were 
business, labor, education, political groups, the press, and politicians. Opponents did 
an awful campaign. They warned, intimidated, threatened, and even bribed voters 
（Rabushka and Ryan, 1982). The legislature attempted to beat Proposition 13 by more 
moderate alternative Proposition 8, which was put on the same ballot（Fujii, 2009). 
Only a few proponents were home owners and two of four Republican candidates for 
the governor.
　　　In fact, Novel Prize winning economist, Paul Samuelson, states that Proposition 
13 may be the most important political-economic event of 1978, and perhaps even of 
the 1970s, in the United States（Francis, 1978).
3. Estimation and Results
　　　
　　　Following typical empirical research in this fi eld, I specify voter turnout as a 
function of available independent variables. I apply the fi xed effects model or LSDV 
（least-squares dummy variable）model（Knack, 1995; Radcliff, 1992; Riel and 
Schram, 1993). The fixed effects model can control for district-specific and time-
invariant factors, the data availability of which is quite limited by supervisorial and 
school district levels in the 1970's. These factors would be somewhat related to the 
term D in equation (1), namely, satisfaction for fulfilling the sense of civic duty or 
satisfaction for expressing solidarity with a candidate.
　　　I address voting for county boards of supervisors and school board members 
among four major levels of local governments in California: county, city, school district 
and special district. As mentioned earlier, the effects of Proposition 13 on these two 
levels of governments will be large enough for the test to be instructive. As discussed 
in the previous section, property tax revenues, on which these governments rely, 
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declined signifi cantly. Moreover, it is more diffi cult to collect data on voter turnout for 
city councils and directors of special districts than county boards of supervisors and 
school board members.
　　　To test the hypothesis that voter turnout for supervisors was lower after the 
passage of Proposition 13 than before, I apply the Chow test of structural change. I 
would predict there is a difference between two regression lines before and after 1978. 
The difference could be due to intercept terms or slope coefficients or both. On the 
other hand, to test the hypothesis that voter turnout for school board members was 
lower after the passage of Proposition 13 than before, I consider that the structural 
change was due to the intercept term only since it would not be possible to construct an 
interaction term due to the availability of data.
3.1. Analysis of County Board of Supervisors
　　　Except for the city-county of San Francisco, which has 11 supervisors and 
a mayor, each county has 5 supervisors elected from 5 supervisorial districts. Since 
county boards of supervisors are chosen for 4-year staggered terms on a nonpartisan 
ballot at primary elections, some of them are chosen at gubernatorial elections and 
the others are chosen at presidential elections. It depends on each county which 
district chooses the supervisor at which election. In some cases supervisors are chosen 
irregularly when incumbents resign or retire during their terms. Due to these features 
panel data is unbalanced.
　　　I compare the two different races for supervisors and for the governor / 
president at the same general elections, which are run-off elections for supervisors. If 
the most popular candidate didn't receive a majority vote at the primary election, the 
most popular candidate and the second-most popular candidate face the run-off election 
in November.１ That is, I focus on the behavior of voters who did join one of the races 
on the ballot but did not join the other of the races on the same ballot at the polls.
　　　I look at 187 districts from 49 counties. The number of observations is 325 at 7 
general elections between 1972 and 1984. The average number of elections per district 
is 1.7. The observation is by county in San Mateo County and Tehama County.
Dependent variable 
　Super: The dependent variable is the voter turnout for supervisors at run-off elections 
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at the general elections. This is given by the number of voters voted for county board 
of supervisors divided by the number of registered voters by supervisorial district.２
Ideally, the number of eligible voters by supervisorial district must be used since it can 
avoid possible miscellaneous effects such as a fl uctuation of the numbers. Registered 
voters would make decisions differently from eligible voters who do not register to 
vote.
　　　I take the logistic transformation on the voter turnout since the transformed 
variable takes the value between negative infinity and positive infinity（Eagle and 
Erfl e; 1989).３
Independent variables
　Prop 13: The dummy variable equals to 1 if the election is held after 1978.
　PreGov represents voter turnout for the president or the governor by supervisorial 
district at general elections except two counties mentioned above. This is the number 
of voters voted for the governor at the gubernatorial elections and the president at the 
presidential elections divided by the number of registered voters. I also applied the 
logistic transformation.
　Closeness measures how close the races are. When the election is by district and 
there is only one seat available, I take the difference between the percentage vote of 
the most popular candidate and the second-most popular candidate. When there are 
two seats, I take the difference between the percentage vote of the second-most popular 
candidate and the third-most popular candidate, and so forth.４
　Democrat is the percentage of Democratic voters in each supervisorial district. The 
observation is by county in San Mateo County and Tehama County.
　　　Financial information by county is also used. Variables include Property tax 
rates, Property tax revenues, Charges for current services, and License fees. Variables 
about expenditures include General function, Protection, Health, Public assistance, 
and Education.５ When the data by supervisorial district is not available, I substitute 
the county data for the supervisorial district data. I compute the value per capita. These 
variables will control for the effects of public spending aspects on voter turnout.
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Table 1. Fixed Effect Estimates
Supervisorial district turnout 1972 - 84（General elections run-off）
Dependent variable: Super（Voter turnout for supervisors）
Note: ＊Signifi cant at the 10％ level  ＊＊Signifi cant at the 1％ level
　　　Table 1 shows the results for run-off elections at the general elections. Year 
dummies are suppressed for ease of presentation. I compared the relative importance 
of voting for supervisors against voting for the governor/president at the same 
elections. The estimated coeffi cients on PreGov and Prop 13× PreGov are statistically 
signifi cant, but the coeffi cient on Prop 13 is not. This indicates that the difference is 
attributed to the slope coefficient. When voter turnout for the governor or president 
increased by one percentage point, voter turnout for the supervisors increased by 0.583 
percentage points on the average before the passage of Proposition 13. On the other 
hand, voter turnout for the supervisors increased by 0.384（0.583-0.199）percentage 
points on the average after the 1978 primary election as voter turnout for the governor 
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or president went up by one percentage point. This implies some of the voters refrained 
from voting for supervisors even though they voted for the governor or president on 
the same ballot, and the number of this type of voters was significantly larger after 
the passage of Proposition 13 than before. Thus, I would conclude that the relative 
importance of county boards of supervisors was smaller compared to the governor or 
the president after the passage of Proposition 13 than before. Among other independent 
variables noteworthy is the negatively estimated coefficient on Closeness. Since 
smaller value of this variable indicates that the race is closer, the probability that one's 
single vote is decisive（the P term in equation (1)）accordingly goes up, which results 
in higher turnout.
    
3.2. Analysis of School Board Members
　　  Dependent variable: Voter turnout for school board members by school district.６ 
The number of vote cast is not divided by the number of registered voters in the district 
because the information is not available. Each school board consists of 3 – 7 members 
with 4-year staggered terms. The number of seats available for school trustees usually 
differs election to election and district to district. To obtain more appropriate turnout, 
I aggregate the number of votes all candidates received and divide it by the number of 
seats when the election system is at large. I use this method because voters can choose 
more than one candidate from the list when the election system is at large. On the other 
hand, when the system is by trustee area, voters can choose only one candidate from 
the list.
　　　I look at 96 elementary and unifi ed school districts in Los Angeles County and 
Orange County. Since high school districts and elementary school districts overlap, 
high school districts are dropped because the time-invariant individual-specifi c effect 
terms are typically assumed to be uncorrelated with other individuals. Elementary 
school districts and unified school districts will never overlap. Community college 
districts are excluded for the same reason. The number of observations is 715 at 10 
school elections between 1967 and 1985.７
Independent variables 
  Average daily attendance: The number of students per school district. Since neither 
the number of eligible voters nor registered voters are available by school district over 
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covered years, I substitute the number of students for the number of voters. Average 
daily attendance will be correlated with voter turnout if parents care about their 
children's school.  
  Prop 13: Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the election is held after 
1978.
  Closeness: This variable measures how close the race is. This is obtained in the same 
way as in the analysis of supervisors.
  Referendum: Dummy variable equals to 1 if another referendum was listed on the 
same ballot. Issues include such as bond issues and revenue measures to raise property 
tax rates.８ Newspapers provide this information.
  Official: Dummy variable equals to 1 if the data source is an official document 
published by the government. The numbers of voter turnout in offi cial documents are 
sometimes larger than those in newspapers. This is perhaps because offi cial documents 
are issued later and can take into account write-in votes or errors such as miscounting. 
Newspapers also sometimes show incomplete results based on the counts of less than 
100 percent of votes cast.
　No opponent: Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is no opponent in the race.
　　　The fi nancial information about school district is also included. The variables 
consist of Total incomes, Incomes given from the federal and state governments 
respectively, and Income raised from school district's own sources. I look at only 
general funds. Incomes from different levels of government consider the shift of power 
caused by the increase in aid.９
Table 2. Fixed Effect Estimates: School district turnout 1967 - 85
Dependent variable: ln（Voter turnout for school board members）
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Note: ＊Signifi cant at the 5％ level  ＊＊Signifi cant at the 1％ level
　　　Table 2 shows the results of the school election analysis. Year dummies are 
suppressed for ease of presentation but are statistically signifi cant in general. Since the 
estimated coeffi cient on Prop 13 is not statistically signifi cant, I wouldn't conclude that 
there was a structural change before and after the passage of Proposition 13.
　　　A possible reason would be confounding effects of another issue, Serrano v. 
Priest. In 1971, the California Supreme court ruled in Serrano that reliance on property 
taxes to finance public schools is unconstitutional and violates the equal protection 
clause of the California Constitution. The court required the inequalities in dollar 
expenditures per student be limited within $100 across districts in Serrano II in 1976. 
As a result, the effects of Proposition 13 which limited property tax rates to 1 percent 
uniformly across the state might be weakened. Fischel（1996）argues that the Serrano 
decision partly caused Proposition 13 to pass. Serrano weakened the Tiebout system, 
and higher-than-average spending districts lost incentives to preserve higher property 
tax rates.
　　　The estimated coefficients on other variables, Closeness, Referendum, No 
opponent, are positive, negative, and positive respectively as I expected.
4. Conclusion
　　　I tested the hypotheses that, if local government offi cials have weaker power 
to set tax policies, then voter turnout for the offi cials will be lower at local elections 
than before based on the Downsian rational voter mode. Analyzing voter turnout for 
the county board of supervisors at run-off elections at general elections from 1972 
to 1984 and school board members at school district elections from 1967 to 1985, I 
have found that voter turnout for supervisors was signifi cantly lower after the passage 
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of Proposition 13 than before, the results of which are consistent with the Downsian 
model, but voter turnout for school board members was not. School district elections in 
California in 1970s might be affected by confounding effects of another issue Serrano v. 
Priest.
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Notes
１ 　It depends on each county whether or not the run-off election is executed. In some counties, the most 
popular candidate wins even though he collects less than a majority vote.
２ 　The number of total votes cast to candidates for the governor and the president by supervisorial district 
is obtained from Statement of Vote issued by the California Secretary of State. The number of total votes 
cast to candidates for the supervisor is obtained from newspapers: Sacramento Bee, Los Angeles Times and 
San Francisco Chronicle. 
　 　The number of registered voters by the supervisorial district level is obtained from Report of 
Registration issued by the California Secretary of State. This report is issued in several months in an 
election year. I use the data one month prior to each primary and general election.
３ 　logistic（Turnout rate）= log {Turnout rate / (1 - Turnout rate)}. With a bit of work, this is reduced to 
log {(voters who voted)/(voters who didn't vote)}. I owe this derivation to Ashish Chaturvedi.
４ 　If candidates are chosen at large by county, I take the difference between the percentage vote of the 
weakest winner and the strongest loser. If the strongest loser received more votes than the weakest winner, 
I calculate the percentage as mentioned above by district, add up the percentages, and divide it by the 
number of districts.
５ 　The data is obtained from Annual Report of Financial Transactions concerning Counties of California 
issued by the State Controller.
６ 　Voter turnout is obtained from school board election results in newspapers such as Los Angeles Times 
and Orange County Register. The school board election results for Los Angeles and Orange Counties are 
used. I also looked at Statement of all votes cast published by Orange County Registrar of Voters.
７ 　One might argue that the shift in school election calendar from March to November in 1978 caused 
some effects on turnout. Turnout can be higher in November in even odd-numbered year because general 
elections are held in November. If so, it would be diffi cult to isolate the effect of the change in election 
calendar from the effect of Proposition 13 on voter turnout.（School elections were executed in April 
before 1973, in March in 1975 and 1977, and in November after 1979. This essay will neglect the shift 
from April to March.）Instead, one might suggest analyzing the effect of the fi rst Serrano case in 1971 
and the legislature response on turnout. Other researchers also argued that the effects of the fi rst Serrano 
and the legislature response（SB 90）on school financing were negligible because the equalization 
was not achieved. But it would be important to analyze the effects of AB 65 following Serrano II and 
Proposition 13 because their effects on public school financing were large. Assembly bill No. 65 was 
designed to respond to Serrano II, approved by the Governor and took effect in the July of 1978（one 
month later than the passage of Proposition 13).
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８　A majority vote or a two-third majority vote is required to approve these measures.
９ 　The fi nancial information for all the public school districts in California for every fi scal year is obtained 
from Annual Report of Financial Transactions concerning School Districts of California issued by the 
State Controller.
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